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Abstract: Тhе study sheds light on the stabilizing role of government budget. 
It finds that in Bulgaria both taxes and government spending are negatively related 
to the real growth rate. This leads to the conclusion that budgetary expenditure 
influence output in a non-Keynesian fashion. The size of discretionary fiscal 
impulse is the main determinant of the non-Keynesian outcome. The results imply 
that although the balanced budget ensures the sustainability of public finances, it 
does not guarantee a growth-stimulating effect in case of a large government 
sector.  Abstention  from  an  active  fiscal  policy  would  allow  the  automatic 
stabilizers to operate freely and to counteract the negative shocks to the economy.    
Keywords:  government budget, stabilizing fiscal policy, Keynesian  ,  
non-Keynesian effects
Introduction
The  standard  Keynesian  view  of  fiscal  policy  implies  that 
budgetary expansions foster economic growth in the short run. When an 
economy is operating below its potential output, the government should 
either increase spending or cut taxes in order to reduce the fluctuations in 
demand. On the contrary, the neoclassical models point out that the fiscal 
consolidation could stimulate the short run aggregate activity and improve 
the quality of public finances. These effects are called “non-Keynesian 
fiscal policy effects”. 
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in fiscal policy issues. In 
the Eurozone Member States, fiscal policy has an important role to play for 
achieving  economic  stabilization  and  growth,  given  the  loss  of  the 
monetary policy instruments. Also, the countries are required to satisfy the 
budgetary rules imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In this 
vein, the article presents the theoretical background of the stabilizing 
impact  of  government  budget.  It  places  emphasis  on  the  theoretical 
explanation of non-Keynesian effects because the traditional Keynesian 
view is well established in the theoretical literature. On the empirical side, 
effects
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Arrangement (1998-2004) - a few years prior to the EU accession. The 
analysis  demonstrates  the  presence  of  non-Keynesian  influences  of 
government outlays on output, and looks at the factors that determine it. 
Tax policy affects the short-run real growth in the traditional Keynesian 
manner. 
Section 2 briefly summarizes the literature. Section 3 explains the 
methodology of the study and provides an empirical analysis of the effects 
of  budgetary  items  on  real  GDP  in  Bulgaria.  The  main  findings  are 
summarized in Section 4.
Literature Review
Theoretical literature
The Keynesian view predicts that the countercyclical fiscal policy 
may be a corrective device to keep unemployment at its equilibrium level, 
and output near its trend growth path. (Burda and Wyplosz, 1997).  Fiscal 
deficits  achieved  by  tax  reductions  or  higher  public  outlays  could 
effectively  counteract  recessions.  When  the  government  changes  its 
spending or the level of taxes, it affects aggregate demand. 
The  stabilizing  role  of  budgetary  policy  is  questioned  by  the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem. This view applies the logic of the forward-
looking  consumer  (Mankiw,  2003).  The  rational  economic  agents 
understand that a tax cut financed by higher public debt means higher taxes 
in the future. A debt-financed tax cut does not reduce the tax burden; it 
merely reschedules it. It does not encourage households to spend more, and 
leaves private consumption unaffected. 
In the standard neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium model, 
the short run effects of fiscal policy depend on a number of factors such as 
the type of taxation, the size and persistence of the discretionary fiscal 
impulse, the elasticity of labor supply (Baxter and King, 1993). In contrast 
with  the  conventional  IS-LM  model,  this  view  emphasizes  on  the 
possibility  for  a  negative  short  run  expenditure  multiplier  in  case  of 
distortionary taxation (i.e. the tax varies with the income). Initiated by 
Giavazzi and Pagano's seminal paper (1990), recent studies have focused 
on the expansionary influence of budgetary consolidations on output in the 
short run. These effects are called “non-Keynesian fiscal policy effects”. 
One of the theoretical explanations is based on the wealth effect on 
consumption (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, Bertola and Drazen, 1993, 
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tax cut and a higher present value of household's income, which stimulates 
private  consumption  and  thus  output.  Opposite  to  the  traditional 
understanding, the wealth effect entails an increase in consumption as a 
result of an expenditure cut. This explanation represents the “expectation 
view” of fiscal policy. 
The effect is stronger when the fiscal changes are perceived as 
permanent. As well, the presence of a positive wealth effect might depend 
on the debt-to-GDP ratio. Economic agents expect that when this ratio 
reaches a certain high level, an upward jump in taxation will occur. If a 
fiscal restriction is undertaken before this expected level of government 
debt, the expectation of a further additional tax increase is lower. This, in 
turn, may boost consumption thus generating a positive wealth effect.
The  second  strand  of  expansionary  fiscal  contractions  calls 
attention to the credibility effect on the interest rates (Alesina et al., 1992, 
McDermott and Wescott, 1996, Sutherland, 1997). This effect works when 
the debt/GDP ratio is high, that is during periods of fiscal stress. At high 
levels of public debt, investors may face an interest rate premium due to the 
default risks or inflation. Fiscal consolidation, that is the improvement of 
the structural government budget balance, can bring a downward pressure 
on the interest rates by reducing the risk premium, which could crowd in 
funding. 
In addition, there is a supply-side channel at work (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 1998). According to the labor market view, cuts in government 
employment or transfer payments may boost employment in the private 
sector and stimulate private economic growth, when economy is near its 
potential level. 
The supply channel operates in both competitive and unionized 
labor markets, although in a different manner (Ardagna, 2007). An increase 
in public employment or government wages in competitive labor markets 
leads to a fall in private sector employment. As was noted earlier, this 
results in a real wage increase and a decline in profits, investments, and thus 
output, in the business sector. 
With unionized labor markets, an increase of public employment or 
wages of public sector employees raises unions' wage claims in the private 
sector which, in turn, may cause wage increases. The result is a negative 
relationship  between  the  government  spending,  specifically  its  wage 
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Survey of empirical studies on post-communist economies
Recently,  a  large  number  of  papers  have  been  exploring  the 
stabilizing effect of government budgets in the EU-15 (for an extensive 
summary,  see,  Hemming  et  al.,  2002,  Prammer,  2004).  This  study 
illuminates the balance between Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of 
fiscal policy in post-communist countries.
Purfield  (2003)  examines  fiscal  adjustments  in  a  number  of 
transition economies between 1992 and 2000. Large and expenditure-based 
fiscal consolidations are successful in sustainable improvement in primary 
balance within two years after the adjustment. The study does not find 
evidence that fiscal tightening could stimulate real growth in the short run. 
In post-communist countries, consumption reacts in a non-linear 
fashion  to  the  budgetary  interventions  (Siwinska  and  Bujak,  2006). 
Households tend to behave in a Keynesian manner in “good times” when 
the level of the fiscal deficit is small (within the limits of the mean value 
plus/minus  one  standard  deviation).  In  “bad  times”,  fiscal  expansions 
stimulate private consumption but on a much smaller degree. In general, the 
non-Keynesian response of consumption during periods of fiscal stress 
does not outweigh the Keynesian effects observed during normal times. 
Rzonca and Cizkowicz (2005) give evidence that in the NMS (New 
Member States) fiscal restrictions accelerate the short-run real growth. An 
important determinant of this non-Keynesian influence is the size of the 
fiscal  intervention.  Large  consolidations  have  been  almost  always 
accompanied by higher rates of output growth. In support of the relevant 
studies mentioned above, the study confirms that fiscal adjustments in the 
NMS have been achieved mainly through expenditure cuts. 
An extensive descriptive analysis of budgetary consolidations in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia between 1996 and 2004 is 
provided by Rzonca and Varoudakis (2007). They demonstrate that fiscal 
adjustments in these economies have occurred during periods of high debt 
levels. The improvements of fiscal stance result solely from a decrease of 
public expenditure, specifically wages and salaries, subsidies or defense 
spending. One exception is the fiscal tightening in Georgia in 2004, which 
has been achieved mainly by broadening the tax base. Georgia's experience 
(1999-2000) was among the most successful ones because over two years 
after the adjustment, the primary balance improved by 4.9 percentage 
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Effects of Fiscal policy in Bulgaria
This paper provides insights into the output effects of discretionary 
budgetary policy in the Bulgarian economy under the Currency Board 
Arrangement. It differs from the abovementioned empirical studies in the 
methodology. 
As is known, the government budget responds automatically to the 
shifts in economic activity. In order to estimate the fiscal policy conducted 
by the authorities, one has to isolate these endogenous changes from the 
discretionary interventions. Most studies on post-communist countries use 
the primary budget balance, which is not cyclically adjusted. Some authors 
employ the “growth-accounting approach” (von Hagen, 2004, Afonso et 
al., 2005). 
In this paper, the discretionary fiscal stance is calculated by the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. Although this method for cyclical adjustment of 
budgetary items is common for studies on the advanced economies (see, for 
example, Brandner et al., 1998, Talvi and Vegh, 2000, Kremer et al., 2006), 
few papers on post-communist countries employ it. Kattai et al. (2002) use 
the HP filter to estimate the output gap in Estonia. Bezdek et al., (2003) 
calculate the natural rate of unemployment and the structural budgetary 
categories in the Czech Republic. This is a novelty approach regarding the 
studies which focus on the short-run effects of fiscal policy on output in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the article makes first attempt to 
evaluate  the  discretionary  budgetary  policy  and  its  stabilizing  role  in 
Bulgaria under the Currency Board Regime.
Quarterly  data  for  primary  government  spending  and  total  tax 
revenue of the general government budget between 1998 and 2004 form the 
basis of the analysis. Primary government spending includes wages and 
social insurance payments, subsidies, expenditure on goods and services, 
social expenditure and capital outlays.
2 The  Hodrick-Prescott  filter  (HP)   with  a  smoothing  parameter 
λ=480 is applied in order to isolate the endogenous changes from the 
discretionary  movements  of  the  budgetarycategories.  The  structural 
(cyclically adjusted) series are expressed as a share of real GDP and 
2    HP filter computes the cyclically adjusted measure (X*) of a variable (X) by minimizing the expression  
Σ( Xt – X*t)2 + λ   [(X*t+1 – X*t) – (X*t – X*t-1)]2, λ is the weighting factor. (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). We 
do not apply a test for causality between fiscal policy variables and short-run real growth because the HP filter 
removes the endogenous component of budgetary items.
Σ
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quarterly data corresponds to λ=30 for annual data, which is the value used 
by the European Central Bank (Bouthevillain et al., 2001). The lower the 
weighting  parameter,  the  better  the  discretionary  policy  shocks  are 
captured. The HP filter has been chosen among a number of alternatives for 
cyclical adjustment because of its popularity, transparency and suitability 
for international comparisons.  For a description of other popular methods, 
see Giorno et al. (1995), Blanchard (1993). 
The discretionary impulse for government expenditure (GIt) is 
defined as a difference between the cyclically adjusted value of primary 
government outlays in the given period and that in the previous period (1): 
GI = g  – g , = ? g   (1), t t t-1
where g is the HP filtered expenditure expressed as a share of GDP. A 
positive/negative value of GI indicates an expansionary/restrictive fiscal 
impulse. 
Respectively, the discretionary changes in tax revenues can be 
calculated in an analogous way by using the cyclically adjusted tax revenue 
(2):
TI = t – t , = ? t   (2), t t  t-1
where t is the HP filtered tax revenue (% GDP). t
Table 1. Discretionary fiscal changes in Bulgaria














impulse       
(% GDP)* 
27  0.2 
 





tax impulse  
(% GDP)** 





*calculated by expression (1)
** calculated by expression (2)
*** the discretionary expenditure impulse is equal to zero during two periods
Source: author's calculations
Expansionary episodes are those for which the expenditure impulse 
(?g) is positive or the tax impulse (?t) is negative. On the contrary, during 
fiscal adjustments ?g takes negative values, while ?t is greater than zero. 
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under observation, the government has followed a policy of expenditure 
loosening.  The  expansionary  episodes  outnumber  the  episodes  of 
expenditure restrictions more than two to one. The negative or near to zero 
structural budget balance (Table 2) indicates that the budget surpluses 
reported by the authorities were due to the automatic tax revenue increases 
in times of economic growth observed in Bulgaria under the Currency 
Board Arrangement (introduced in July, 1997).
Table 2.  General government budget balance (1998-2004)









(%  GDP) 
5.5  3.9  3.4  3.1  1.6  2.1  3.5 
Real GDP 
growth (%)** 
4.0  2.3  5.4  4.1  4.5  5.0  6.6 
  *The structural primary budget balance is calculated using the HP filtered tax revenues 
and government spending.
**average annual growth rate
Source: author's calculations, National Statistical Institute, Ministry of Finance
Figure 1 gives evidence of a negative relationship between the 
discretionary expenditure changes and the real GDP growth on impact, 
which  implies  a  presence  of  non-Keynesian  effects.  The  correlation 
between the expenditure impulse and the real GDP growth is strong and 
negative (correlation coefficient of -0.91). As can be seen from the graph, 
the restrictive fiscal impulse has always been accompanied by a positive 
rate of growth. Such a negative relationship is not observed in all cases of a 
positive spending shock, but it is clear that the negative rates of real growth 
have occurred during times of large fiscal expansions.   
Figure 2 illuminates the behavior of tax policy. The lower average 
tax burden has accelerated the real GDP growth. So, the fiscal categories 
influence the Bulgarian economy in a non-linear fashion: while a typical 
Keynesian result prevails for taxes, a non-Keynesian outcome is valid for 
government outlays. In this vein, the study tries to answer the question 
about the factors, which determine the effects of expenditure on output. An 
13
IBSU Scientific Journal      2 (1), 2008appropriate instrument for evaluating the determinants of non-Keynesian 
effects of budgetary outlays is the Logit regression.
Figure 1. Impact of expenditure policy.
Source: author's calculation
Figure 2. Impact of tax policy
Source: author's calculations
The regression model is of the following form:
where y is a binary variable reflecting the influence of the discretionary 
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on output, that is when the discretionary fiscal impulse (∆g) and the real 
GDP growth (y ) are moving inversely: an economic downturn/upturn  growth
is  observed  when  the  cyclically  adjusted  budgetary  expenditure 
increase/decrease;
y = 0 in case of a traditional Keynesian effect of government 
expenditure on the short-run economic activity, that is when ∆g and y   growth
are moving in the same direction: the positive interventions on government 
spending have been accompanied by a positive rate of real GDP growth. 
The  choice  of  factor  variables  (x)  depends  on  the  relevant 
theoretical and empirical findings as well as on the descriptive analysis 
presented above. According to the previous studies, main determinants of 
non-Keynesian effects are the size of the fiscal impulse and the level of 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Also, fiscal restrictions are more likely than fiscal 
expansions to demonstrate a non-Keynesian impact on output. Each of 
these factors is tested as a possible determinant through a Logit model. In 
light of this, the independent variables (x) are defined as follows.
TYPEIMPU  denotes  the  type  of  the  discretionary  expenditure 
impulse.
 TYPEIMPU =    1 in case of an expansionary impulse (∆g >0)
                           0 in case of a restrictive impulse (∆g < 0)
The inclusion of this variable in the model would show whether the 
non-Keynesian  effects  of  government  spending  prevail  in  times  of 
expenditure increases or in times of expenditure restrictions. Most studies 
underline the expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations. 
SIZEIMPU presents the size of the discretionary fiscal impulse 
(∆g)
 SIZEIMPU =     1 for significant expenditure impulses 
                           0 for neutral (insignificant) expenditure impulses
The  fiscal  intervention  is  defined  as  “significant”  if  the 
discretionary expenditure impulse (GI= ∆g) lies outside the interval of the 
mean value (µ ) plus/minus one half the standard deviation (σ ). Otherwise,  g g
the fiscal intervention is insignificant (neutral). Table 3 presents the values 
of the binary variable SIZEIMPU. The discretionary expenditure impulse 




IBSU Scientific Journal      2 (1), 2008expenditure intervention is restrictive if ∆g is negative, smaller than (µ - ½  g 
σ ). Otherwise, the discretionary impulse is defined as neutral. g
Table 3. Values of variable SIZEIMPU
µ =0.2 is the sample average of ∆g, σ  = 0.5 is the standard deviation. The discretionary expenditure impulse is  g g
regarded as neutral (SIZEIMPU=0) if its value is between (µ  - ½ σ ) and (µ  + ½ σ ), otherwise, the fiscal impulse  g g g g
is defined as significant (SIZEIMPU=1).
Source: author's calculations
Although  small  discretionary  expansions  prevail,  significant 
expenditure  changes  -  either  expansionary  or  restrictive  -  have  been 
enforced in 13 out of 27 cases. The qualitative analysis shows that 85% of 
these large interventions have been accompanied by a non-Keynesian 
response of real GDP. On the contrary, the Keynesian outcome prevails 
(92%) during times of small changes in government outlays. 
The inclusion of this variable allows verification of the hypothesis 
that the size of the discretionary impulse is an important factor for the 
appearance of non-Keynesian effects. The relevant literature concludes 
that the larger the fiscal impulse, the greater the probability of a non-
Keynesian result.
The variable GOVDEBT reflects the role of initial conditions, 
specifically the level of government debt. According to the theoretical 
explanations, a non-Keynesian result is more probable when the debt-to-
GDP  ratio  is  high.  During  times  of  “fiscal  stress”,  economic  agents 
appreciate the authorities' efforts to improve the long-term sustainability of 
public finances through fiscal tightening, which stimulate private demand 
and output. GOVDEBT is a nominal variable equal to the government 
debt/GDP ratio. 
The  next  exogenous  variable  SIZET  reflects  the  size  of  the 
Size of discretionary 
expenditure impulse 






-?  < ? g < µg - ½ σg  Significant 
(Restrictive) 
1  6 
µg - ½ σg < ?g < 0  Neutral  0  1 
0 < ?g < µg + ½ σg  Neutral  0  13 
µg + ½ σg < ?g < ?   Significant 
(Expansionary) 
1  7 
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between the tax policy and the non-Keynesian response of output to an 
expenditure shock.  SIZET  is  a  binary  variable, similar  in  nature  and 
definition to the variable SIZEIMPU. Its value is based on the size of the 
discretionary tax revenue impulse (TI) defined in (2). SIZET is equal to 1  t
when the tax intervention is above the mean value (µ) plus/minus a half the  t
standard deviation (σ).  t
                 SIZET =     0, µ-1/2* σ < ?t < µ+1/2* σ t t t t
                                   1, otherwise 
A positive value of SIZET would mean that the non-Keynesian 
influence of government outlays on the economy is more probable in case 
of higher discretionary tax changes. In Bulgaria, large revenue changes 
have occurred at times of significant increases in government outlays 
(2/3rds of cases). 
The reduced-form model takes the following form:
The results of regression analysis are presented in Table 4. Two 
exogenous variables have statistically significant coefficients: SIZEIMPU 
and SIZET. The type of the discretionary impulse (TYPEIMPU) is not 
among factors determining the outcome, since non-Keynesian effects have 
occurred during both fiscal expansions and fiscal contractions (see, Figure 
1).  In  addition,  the  level  of  government  debt  does  not  influence  the 
behavior of real output. Such a conclusion is not unreasonable in light of 
the above analysis that non-Keynesian effects result not only from an 
accomodating budgetary policy leading to higher debt levels but also from 
expenditure consolidations.
 
GOVDEBT a SIZET a










+ + + =
-
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* the dependent variable presents the probability of a non-Keynesian impact of 
government expenditure on output
**significant at 0.05 level
*** significant at 0.1 level
The  size  of  the  fiscal  intervention  is  a  statistically  significant 
determinant of the stabilizing impact of public spending. As figure 3(a) 
emphasizes,  significant  changes  in  public  spending  entail  a  higher 
probability of a non-Keynesian response of output. This probability is 
approximately 0.9 if the discretionary expenditure impulse is above the 
mean value plus/minus a half the standard deviation. By contrast, small 
changes lead to a traditional Keynesian impact on aggregate activity in the 
short run. This implies that larger expenditure cuts have more successfully 
stimulated the economy. 
The  regression  coefficient  for  the  variable  SIZET  is  also 
statistically significant. If the variable SIZET lies outside the interval (µ -  t
½*σ; µ + ½*σ), the probability of a non-Keynesian response is near 0.6  t t t
Figure 3 (b) implies that larger increases in the average tax burden have 
been accompanied by non-Keynesian effects of budgetary purchases on 
output. This is due to the fact that under the Currency Board Arrangement, 
the Bulgarian authorities keep a budget close to balance or in surplus. Both 
spending and taxes are moving in an upward direction: in order to keep the 
government's budget constraint, higher spending requires a higher tax 
burden. 
The results imply that the balanced-budget policy in countries with 
a growing public sector could have a negative impact on macroeconomic 
activity. Thus, the imposition of fiscal rules on the overall budget balance 
Variable  Regr.coeff.  Wald test  Pseudo R
2 
Size of discretionary 
expenditure impulse 
(SIZEIMPU) 
5.05**  5.2  0.77 
Type of discretionary 
expenditure impulse 
(TYPEIMPU) 
10.1  0.07  0.51 
Size of discretionary tax 
impulse 
(SIZET) 
1.5***  3.07  0.16 
GOVDEBT  -0.0  1.06  0.05 
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Stability and Growth Pact provides benchmarks for fiscal frameworks of 
the Eurozone members. Each country should keep a budget balance-to-
GDP ratio below 3% and a debt-to-GDP ratio below 60%. The Pact does not 
specify  rules  about  the  level  of  current  government  spending,  public 
investments or taxes. In light of this study, it is important to evaluate how 
the country meets the budget balance, by raising taxes and spending or by 
lowering both. Following current SGP rules is not enough in order to create 
a  growth-enhancing  environment  because  an  expenditure  expansion 
accompanied by a tight tax policy could decelerate the real growth.
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This study illuminates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in 
Bulgaria during the period of EU accession. The descriptive analysis shows 
a negative relationship between the discretionary expenditure interventions 
and the short-run output growth. On the other hand, the tax policy affects 
output in the standard Keynesian manner.  
The size of the discretionary impulse is the main determinant of the 
non-Keynesian  impact  of  government  outlays:  the  stronger  fiscal 
expansions/contractions  are  more  likely  to  decelerate/accelerate  GDP 
growth.  This result supports the relevant studies on both advanced and 
post-communist economies.
The findings of the study have important practical implications for 
Bulgaria's fiscal policy. Due to the Currency Board Arrangement, Bulgaria 
completely satisfies the criteria for the general government budget deficit 
and  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  imposed  by  the  SGP.  Since  2002,  the 
government debt has been constrained below 60% of GDP, while the 
overall budgetary balance has remained within the 3% reference value. The 
empirical results indicate that although the balanced budget ensures the 
sustainability of public finances, it could not guarantee a stimulating effect 
on output - the fiscal policy mix is a crucial factor for economic growth as 
well. The government's size was continuously growing during the period 
under observation. It remains among the highest ones in the New Member 
States during the last two years (40.5% in 2005 and 38% in 2006). 
The imposition of restrictions on the overall budget balance and the 
level of government debt alone is not enough; there should be regulations 
on the budgetary categories themselves. The presence of both Keynesian 
and  non-Keynesian  effects  of  budgetary  items  shows  that  in  view  of 
accelerating growth prospects, the balanced budget should be achieved by a 
mix of government expenditure restrictions and lower taxes.
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